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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
same view as the American cases, although some of the cases are put on
different grounds.
In a few cases the courts have seemed too ready to call the transfer
fraudulent, but this probably has resulted from the somewhat loose construc-
tion which they placed on what appeared to them an unfair transfer. Leach
v. Duvall (1871), 71 Ky. 201; Ward v. Ward (1900), 63 Ohio St. 125, 57
N. E. 1095; Youngs v. Carter, above. Taylor v. Taylor justly follows a long
line of authorities and does not unnecessarily presume fraud, which is patent
in the case. G. S., '31.
COPYRIGHTS--MUSICAL COmPOSITION-RECEPTION FOR PROFIT.-In Buck
v Duncan et al. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1929), 32 F. (2d) 366, a suit for infringe-
ment of the copyright of a musical selection, the plaintiff, owner of the
copyright, permitted a radio station to broadcast the piece. The defendant,
owner of a hotel in Kansas City, received the selection over his master set
and transmitted it to headpieces in each room in the hotel. The plaintiff
sued for damages for infringement of its copyright upon the ground that
the hotel owner performed the work publicly for profit. Held, there was
not an infringement of the copyright.
The language of the copyright statute is as follows: "Any person entitled
thereto upon complying with the provisions of this act, shall have the ex-
clusive right: . . . To perform the copyright work publicly for profit if
it be a musical composition and for purposes of public performance for
profit." 17 U. S. C. sec. 1 (e). One who performs a copyright work
publicly for profit without the consent of the owner obviously infringes.
The court holds to the view that in relaying the selections to each room
the defendant was merely extending the hearing possibilities of his guests
so as to allow them to hear the original performance as broadcast. The
court concedes that there is a public performance for profit where a copy-
righted phonograph record is played to an audience for a direct or indirect
monetary gain. An unauthorized use of a music roll of a copyrighted selec-
tion in a player piano as an accompaniment to a photo-play for which
admission is charged is an infringement. M. Witmark and Sons v. Gallo-
way et al. (D. C. Tenn. 1927), 22 F. (2d) 412. But the court contends that
there is a difference in fact between playing a phonograph record and re-
ceiving and using a record impressed on the ether. The court writes:
"The record on bakelite is a separate and distinct thing from the original
performance in the studio where it is made. Playing the record is per-
forming anew the musical composition imprinted on it. The waves thrown
out upon the ether are not a record of the original performance. Their
reception is not reproduction, but a hearing of the original performance."
This technical distinction seems too unreal to furnish a proper basis for the
decision. Whether the master receiving set sends the original on to the
rooms or sends it reproduced, the hotel owner profits by furnishing the com-
position to his guests. It is this economic fact which is determining in other
cases.
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Thus a broadcaster who plays and sends out an unauthorized musical
composition and for profit makes this selection available to the public is an
infringer. He is also a contributory infringer if he broadcasts the un-
authorized performance by another of a copyrighted musical composition.
J. H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co. (D. C. N. Y. 1925), 4 F. (2d)
160. The master set owner, it would seem, is in the same relative position.
The court in the instant case based its decision upon the further ground
that the defendant did not intentionally perform the copyrighted selection.
But lack of intention does not relieve him from liability. The result, and
not the intention, determines the question of infringement. Lawrence v.
Dana (1869), 4 Cliff. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 8136; M. Witmark and Sons v. Gallo-
way et al. (D. C. Tenn. 1927), 22 F. (2d) 412.
On other grounds than those put forth by the court it might be held that
the defendant is not liable. The doctrine might be set up that the con-
tract between the copyright owner and the broadcaster is for the benefit of
all who wish to receive and use the program, whether for personal enjoy-
ment or for profit.
Looking at the decision from the point of view of its practicality, there
is much to be said for it. A decision in favor of the copyright owner would
affect not only hotels but also restaurants, music shops, and similar estab-
lishments which constantly make use of broadcasts. The result would be
great inconvenience and a constant threat of unwarranted litigation.
When Congress framed the copyright act it did not foresee the advent of
the radio with its new problems. The balancing of interests which is
necessary in determining the scope of the protection to be afforded by a
copyright is one which Congress should deal with in further legislation.
Compare Associated Press v. International News Service (1918), 248 U. S.
215 at p. 248, per Brandeis J. dissenting. M. E. S., '31.
IN5suRA ,E-DuTY OF INDEMNIFIER TO SETTLE WrHIN POLICY Lir.--
In a suit against an indemnity company the assured sought to recover the
amount spent above the amount of the indemnity to satisfy a claim which de-
fendant company had allowed to go to judgment instead of settling for less
than the amount of the indemnity bond, as it could have done. The Texas court
in deciding in favor of the plaintiff, in Stowers Furniture Co. v. American
Indemnity Co. (Tex. 1929), 15 S. W. (2d) 544, said that the insurance com-
pany owes a duty of reasonable diligence in settling a suit against the
assured.
At first glance such a holding may seem very far-fetched since the as-
sured is never precluded from intervening and settling for whatever he
deems proper, and may then enforce his claim to the indemnity, even though
the liability was not established by a judgment. Mendota Electric Co. v.
N. Y. Indemnity Co. (1926), 169 Minn. 377, 211 N. W. 317; Hoagland
Wagon Co. v. London Guaranty Co. (1919), 201 Mo. A. 490, 212 S. W. 393;
Rieger v. London Guaranty Co. (1920), 202 Mo. A. 184, 215 S. W. 920.
Under such a view the assured takes the entire responsibility in case of a
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